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In the  U.S.  utilities  have  attempted  to slow  the  growth  of distributed  generation  (DG)  solar
by reversing  policy  support,  and  they have  greater  ﬁnancial  and  political  resources  than
the  solar  industry.  Empirical  analysis  of all major  cases  of  niche-regime  conﬂict  over  net
metering  policies  in  the  U.S.  shows  that  utilities  are  testing  a range  of  strategies  to  slow
the  growth  of DG  solar,  and outcomes  vary  by strategy  type.  An  additional  analysis  of  four
case studies  of  DG  solar  conﬂicts  shows  that  niche  organizations  can  partially  overcome  the
political power  of regime  organizations  via  three  mechanisms:  form  coalitions  with  political
parties that  support  the  niche  technologies,  gain  support  from  countervailing  industrial
organizations,  and  form  coalitions  with  social  movements  to  mobilize  political  protests
and  petitions.  The  political  opportunity  structure  (in  this  case  the party  in control  of  the
state  government)  affects  the  pattern  of  niche-regime  strategies  and  interactions.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Sustainability transitions (STs) require substantial changes in industrial regimes that are likely to result in resistance
from the incumbent organizations. The motivations for resistance include the perceived threat to proﬁts and organizational
stability as well as concerns with the technological feasibility and societal costs associated with STs. The latter set of concerns
tend to be more legitimate in the policy ﬁeld, which in heavily regulated industries such as electricity exercises a strong
inﬂuence on the pace of STs. This study examines the complex mixture of proﬁts, self-preservation, technical feasibility,
and societal costs that are involved in regime resistance to the growth of distributed generation (DG) solar (mostly rooftop
photovoltaics) in the U.S.
DG solar is growing in many countries, and regime resistance to it is appearing elsewhere in the world (e.g., Geels et al.,
2014). However, there are some speciﬁc dimensions to the issue that make the analysis of the U.S. case interesting. There
has been very rapid growth of DG solar led in part by new ﬁnancing arrangements and the inﬂux of capital investments.
Furthermore, political conﬂicts have been framed in terms of freedom of choice, a particularly salient issue in the U.S., in
addition to environmental and economic beneﬁts. Although this study is cognizant of the speciﬁcities of the industry and
the country, the goal is to use the U.S. case to develop a broader contribution to the literature on regime resistance and the
politics of niche-regime conﬂicts.
Because the growth of DG solar is dependent on regulatory policies that affect its economic feasibility, the outcome of
the regime-niche relationship is highly dependent on public policy and political decisions. This case therefore provides an
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pportunity to build on research that recognizes the need to include greater attention to politics and power in the analysis
f STs (Avelino and Rotmans, 2009; Geels, 2014; Jiusto and McCauley, 2010; Kern and Smith, 2008; Verbong and Geels,
007). As Meadowcroft notes, the analysis of politics requires “explicit attention from those interested in understanding
ustainability transitions” (2011: 73). Likewise, as Grin et al. argue, a central challenge of ST studies is to understand how
to tilt the balance of power and legitimacy between incumbent and sustainable practices” (2011: 80).
After a background section that reviews the conceptual framework and the history of solar energy policy in the U.S.,
olitical conﬂict will be analyzed using two strategies: an overview of DG solar across the U.S. to show how incumbent
rganizations test various resistance strategies to niche growth, and a detailed analysis of four cases to show how niche
ctors can exercise political power as well.
. Background framework and history
.1. Regime resistance and the “Weapons of the Niche”
The literature on STs has begun to analyze the mechanisms of political conﬂict and regime resistance. Elzen et al. (2011)
rgue that a successful ST requires not only a technically and economically feasible technology but also the alignment of these
actors with political conditions such as normative pressure and regulatory openings. Research on off-shore wind energy in
orway also reveals the necessity of aligning technological readiness with political opportunities (Normann, 2015). In the
ase of DG solar, the technology is feasible and in many cases at or near the cost of grid-delivered electricity. Regime actors
ave become alarmed at the growth and have mobilized to slow it. Thus, the conﬂict between utilities and the DG solar
ndustry provides good material to think through both regime resistance strategies and how niche organizations respond to
egime resistance.
Because the incumbent regime organizations are large and wealthy in comparison with niche organizations, the political
nd economic conﬂict can have a “David and Goliath” quality. As Geels notes, one of the challenges of ST theory is to “shift
he analytical agenda to better understand how ‘Goliath’ can be weakened, eroded and destabilized, to enhance the chances
f green Davids” (Geels 2014: 37). The case of DG solar and the utilities is a good example of such unequal power. In the
.S. the utility industry spent over $21 million in campaign donations in 2014 in comparison with the roughly $2 million
pent by the entire sector of renewable energy industries (Center for Responsive Politics, 2015). Yet, even with these Goliath
dvantages, the utilities have not always ended policy support for DG solar and contained its rapid growth.
The analysis that follows has two goals. The ﬁrst is to understand better the strategies that regime organizations use to
esist the growth of niches that are perceived to be incompatible. The transition studies literature recognizes that incumbent
rganizations will try to capture the policy process and turn it to their favor (e.g., Voss et al., 2009); this study shows how
ncumbent organizations test different approaches to inﬂuencing the policy process and how they pursue a mixed strategy
f both economic investment and political inﬂuence. The second goal is to understand better the political strategies of niche
rganizations in response to regime resistance, in other words, to understand the “weapons of the niche,” to borrow and
odify a phrase from Scott (1987). Clearly, the primary basis of support for ST niches in the policy arena is that policymakers
ecognize the need to address environmental sustainability issues in ways that create jobs and enhance competitiveness.
owever, when powerful industrial regimes attempt to defend their business-as-usual models, political consensus for this
ustiﬁcation for STs can break down. In such circumstances, what are the political strategies available to niche organizations
nd their coalitions?
Previous research has suggested that countervailing industrial power is one lever that niche organizations can deploy.
irms from the technology and ﬁnancial sectors have invested in DG solar, and donors from the sectors have made signiﬁcant
ampaign expenditures in related state-level policy disputes over carbon regulation and renewable energy (Hess, 2014).
owever, in the case of DG solar conﬂicts, the primary countervailing power of these ﬁrms has been investment rather than
olitical support. Thus, this study examines two additional levers of power for niches in the political ﬁeld: alliances with
olitical parties and social movements.
With respect to political parties, the ideal for the niche actors is to have political consensus in support of the ST so that
he niche-regime relationship is not aligned with party differences. However, in some countries regime organizations have
ormed strong alliances with political conservatives to reduce regulatory support for ST niche development. This pattern is
specially prominent in the U.S., Canada, and Australia, but it can also be found to some degree in non-Anglophone countries
uch as Germany (Hoppmann et al., 2014). When support for the ST becomes politically polarized, the relationship between
olitical parties becomes aligned with conﬂicts among advocacy coalitions. These coalitions connect deep core beliefs that
re associated with right and left political ideologies with more speciﬁc and malleable disputes over policy directions and
mplementation (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). However, party control of the state shifts for a wide range of reasons, and thus
egime coalitions can face situations where their political allies are not in power. In the U.S., opportunities for continued
upport of ST electricity policies tend to be largely in states controlled by the Democratic Party (Coley and Hess, 2012; Hess
nd Mai, 2015).The second form of niche power involves contentious politics (McAdam et al., 2001). Whereas advocacy coalitions and
arty alliances function within institutionalized politics, social movement coalitions can draw on an expanded repertoire
f action that includes protest. It is difﬁcult to measure the effects of protest events on legislative and regulatory bodies,
ut the events do bring media attention to the issue and put pressure on regulatory bodies to develop policies that are not
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transparently supportive of regime coalitions. As will be shown below, these protests have been a salient factor in some of
the state-government controversies over DG solar.
In summary, the case of DG solar politics in the U.S. is used to advance the analysis of niche-regime conﬂict by examining
(1) the range of regime resistance strategies and their outcomes and (2) the levers or “slings” that serve as “weapons of the
niche” in political conﬂicts.
2.2. Background history: solarization in the U.S. electricity industry
In some states electricity generation, transmission, and retail sales are divided among separate organizations, whereas in
other states utilities still function under the older integrated model. Although the majority of utilities in the U.S. are either
public (usually municipal) utilities or cooperatives, the small number of investor-owned utilities (IOUs) serves the largest
number of customers. Most cooperatives are for rural areas, and generally they were founded during the era of electriﬁcation.
Unless otherwise speciﬁed, the term “utility” will be used below to mean IOUs, which are regulated by a state’s public utilities
commission (PUC).
In the U.S. the post-World War  II energy policy recognized the long-term potential for a transition from dependence on
fossil fuels, but in the niche space that received government support for an energy transition in the U.S., nuclear energy
was accorded preferential status over solar. The emergent green-transition coalition of the 1970s and 1980s emphasized
solar designs compatible with local control (Laird, 2001), a vision that contrasted with the utilities’ desire to maintain a
centralized, grid-oriented model (Lipschutz and Mulvaney, 2013; Reece, 1979). Solar advocates also criticized the focus of
government funding on large-scale, centralized solar technology (Metz, 1977). Thus, the conﬂict between small-scale solar
and the utility industry in the U.S. dates back at least to the 1970s.
Despite the failure to gain control over the solar research funding agenda, solar advocates inﬂuenced Democratic Party
President Carter and his staff to develop a supportive solar policy, including a goal of 25% solar by 2000. However, when the
Republican President Reagan was elected in 1980, solar advocates lost their tenuous inﬂuence on federal policy, a change
symbolized by Reagan’s decision to remove solar panels from the White House. The green transition coalition then shifted
its attention to state governments, which by the early 1980s were beginning to develop renewable portfolio standards and
net metering laws. Net metering is a fee structure in which the utility pays customers for their DG solar generation at the
retail rate; it is sometimes described as spinning the meter backward.
In the U.S. the ﬁrst net metering law was introduced in 1983 in Minnesota, and the ﬁrst renewable portfolio standard was
introduced in Iowa during the same year. There was  a slow increase in net metering laws until 1996, after which the rate of
state government support grew rapidly based on a regional diffusion pattern (Stoutenborough and Beverlin, 2008). A similar
pattern occurred for renewable portfolio standards, which expanded in two waves, one in the late 1990s and another in the
mid-2000s (Wiser et al., 2007). The federal government’s Energy Policy Act of 2005 supported the diffusion of net metering
and interconnection provisions by requiring state PUCs to consider these policies. By 2013, 44 states had such policies, and 30
states had mandatory renewable portfolio standards, with voluntary standards in seven other states. Although net metering
laws are widely diffused, they also place limits on DG solar: in about half the states there is a subscriber limit for DG solar,
generally in the range of 1–5% of peak demand, and there is also a limit on the amount of power allowed in interconnection
arrangements, generally below 1000 kW.
2.3. Disruptions to the niche status of DG solar
The utilities responded to the policy support for solar by favoring utility-scale solar farms rather than DG solar. Although
DG solar was introduced in many states under net metering rules, in most cases it remained a tiny percentage of overall
electricity production. Thus, until recently it posed no threat to the utilities’ centralized model. However, since 2000 three
factors have altered this situation. First, average retail prices tend to increase over time, whereas the cost of photovoltaic
solar has continued to decline toward the price of other energy sources. Second, state governments have authorized ﬁnancing
programs that have facilitated DG solar by allowing building owners to pay back the costs of installation with an annual
property tax payment (property assessed clean energy) or with a payment on the utility bill (on-bill ﬁnancing). Although these
programs have been restricted partially for residential ﬁnancing, they have grown dramatically for commercial buildings.
Third, ﬁrms from the neighboring industries of ﬁnance and technology have seen DG solar as a strong investment opportunity.
As part of the background analysis, our review of major solar ﬁnancing deals from 2011 through 2013 found that there was
over $5 billion in investments in the solar installation sector, mostly from large banks but also from Google, Honda, and
venture capital ﬁrms. An important avenue of investment has been third-party ownership (TPO). TPO involves either a lease,
in which the building owner pays a monthly fee to the DG solar provider, or a power-purchase agreement, in which the
building owner agrees to purchase the power generated from the solar unit at an established price and term. Terms usually
run 10–20 years, and building owners have the option to purchase the photovoltaic unit at the end of the term or earlier.
In some cases TPO has grown so rapidly that it has replaced loans and ownership as the main model for ﬁnancing new DG
solar.
These changes converged to produce a growth spurt for DG solar of 20% during some ﬁnancial reporting quarters after
2010. Although the growth rate was on a very small base of less than 1% of overall load, projected growth in general demand
for electricity has slowed, and in some states the growth of DG solar could absorb the projected growth of total electricity
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emand. By 2013 industry analysts were predicting “a new solar revolution in the U.S., this time driven by the distributed
eneration (DG) market” (Kann et al., 2013: 4). A report issued by the Edison Electric Institute (an IOU trade association) also
oted that improving cost curves could prove disruptive for the centralized grid model (Kind, 2013). The report included
omparisons with other disruptive innovations such as the impact of digital photographic technologies on Kodak and the
Phone on the Blackberry (Kind, 2013). The report also noted that as energy storage technologies improve, DG customers
ould then sever the connection with the grid, a change that the report likens to the declining use of land lines in the
elephone industry. As a fellow from the industry-funded Electric Power Research Institute stated, “We  did not get in front
f this disruption. It may  be too late” (Cardwell, 2013). Other industry leaders, such as Michael Yackira, the chair of the
dison Electric Institute, described the situation in more optimistic terms: “I see an opportunity for us to recreate ourselves,
ust like the telecommunications industry did” (ibid.).
In response to the perceived threat, the utilities have mounted diverse campaigns against DG solar in state governments,
here electricity policy is enacted. The campaigns are in turn embedded in a broader set of political alliances with the fossil-
uel sector and the Republican Party that oppose the green transition programs endorsed by many Democratic Party leaders.
onservative coalitions have attempted to withdraw states from greenhouse gas emissions agreements, to overturn net
etering, and to end renewable portfolio standards. Progress on the expansion of state-level renewable portfolio standards
nd carbon emissions agreements has come to a stand-still, and in some states the legislatures have frozen or reversed their
revious commitments to renewable energy.
. Analysis of regime-niche political conﬂicts
The analysis in this section focuses on the political conﬂict that has developed between the utilities and the DG solar
ndustry, consumers, environmentalists, and other advocates. Rather than attempt to test hypotheses, the analytic strategy
nvolves a comparative, qualitative approach; this method is appropriate for the research goal of developing hypotheses for
uture research. The research presented here is based on a review of approximately 300 documents and news reports, and
t builds on a larger, multi-year study of green-transition policies in state and city governments in the U.S. (Hess et al., 2015,
016). The multiyear study includes interviews, attendance at conferences, analysis of legislation, and other data sources.
wo analytical strategies are employed in this study.
The ﬁrst approach is extensive in the sense that it is based on a review of all of the major net metering controversies in the
.S. during the period from early 2013 through mid-2015, and it asks the following question: what is the range of strategies
hat incumbent regime ﬁrms (the utilities) use to resist the challenges of DG solar, and which strategies are more and less
uccessful? The second, case-study approach is based on a review of four of the most prominent cases of battles over net
etering. With respect to the case studies, the following question is addressed: what role do party politics and contentious
olitics play in the niche-regime conﬂicts?
.1. Overview of regime resistance strategies to DG solar
Table 1 provides a summary of the utilities’ main initiatives to end net metering policy and to control DG solar in the U.S. It
s clear that the utilities have been testing a range of strategies with varying levels of success. By far the most common strategy
as been to seek a fee increase or rate reduction for net metering customers. To justify the policy change, the utilities do not
ake their case based on a threat to their business model and proﬁts. Instead, they argue that DG solar customers beneﬁt
rom interconnection, but the payment from utilities to DG customers at the retail price does not adequately reﬂect the
ost of grid interconnection. In cases where DG solar generation exceeds building consumption, households and businesses
eneﬁt from grid services at no cost. The costs to the utility are then transferred onto other, non-DG customers, with the
ffect that the DG customers are being unfairly subsidized by the non-DG customers. As the level of DG solar installations
ncreases, the relative burden for grid interconnection for DG customers increasingly shifts to non-DG customers.
Whereas the utilities argue that net metering represents a free rider problem, advocates of DG solar argue that the utilities
re blocking a form of energy that is popular among consumers and that has broad beneﬁts for the environment and for
he grid. They also emphasize consumer rights, but they focus on the rights of consumers to choose solar technology. They
lso argue that the utilities are not taking into account environmental beneﬁts of DG solar and the avoided costs in new
on-solar generation and transmission.
The utilities’ strategy of winning a reduced payment rate for DG solar or a connection fee has been unsuccessful or
arginally successful in many cases. In Arizona and California, the strategy was successful but only at rate that was low
nough not to cripple the DG solar industry ($5–10 per month). However, the new payment structure in Wisconsin shows
hat under some conditions it may  be possible for the utilities to win  a new fee structure for DG solar that is high enough to
nd the rapid growth rate.The following patterns also emerge from Table 1:
Attempts to gain monopoly control over solar energy, such as the legislative effort in the Washington State and the court
case in Iowa, have not been successful.
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Table  1
Summary of strategies to reduce the growth of net metering.
State and Utility Date Regime Resistance Strategy Outcome as of early 2015
Arizona (Arizona Public
Service, Tucson Electric
Service)
2013–15 PUC proposal for DG connection fee of $50 per month;
additional proposals in 2015 for increased ﬁx fee
Accepted at $5–10 per month;
other proposals pending
Arizona  (Arizona Public
Service)
2015 Federal government complaint: “shady” TPO Practices Federal government decision
pending
Arizona  (Salt River Project) 2014 Increased fee of $50 per month Adopted (public power, no PUC
approval required)
Arizona (Arizona Public
Service, Tucson Electric Power)
2014 Permission to enter own rooftop solar market. Utility owns
solar and reimburses building owner at an agreed-upon
rate
PUC approves
California (IOUs) 2013–14 Battery storage leads to fraud risk, require two meters and
additional fees
PUC orders utilities to end
roadblocks for DG solar
California (IOUs) 2013 Raises NM cap but authorizes PUC to develop successor
tariff to NM (AB 327)
PUC develops process for
successor tariff determination
California (IOUs) 2015 Utilities propose end to net metering to PUC PUC decision pending
Colorado (Xcel) 2013- Replace NM with value of solar PUC decision pending
Florida (Lakeland) 2015 Proposed demand charge for residential solar PUC decision pending
Florida (NextEra) 2013 Purchase of DG solar developer SmartEnergy Agreement reached
Florida (Various) 2015 Solar advocates gain signatures for a ballot initiative for
TPO DG solar
Utilities attempt to block in
court, launch counter-initiative
Georgia (Georgia Power) 2013–2015 DG connection fee of $28 per month; after state approval
of TPO, the utility sets up its own division
PUC rejects proposal, state
approves utility-controlled
TPO (HB 57)
Hawaii (Hawaiian Electric) 2013- Grid security risk; moratorium on new sales PUC orders long-term plan;
legislature orders pro-solar
changes
Idaho  (Idaho Power) 2013 DG connection fee to $21–23 per month, decrease retail
rate payment
PUC rejects proposal
Indiana (various) 2015 PUC may  allow utilities to pay DG solar at avoided cost (HB
1320)
Legislation not enacted
Iowa  (Alliant, MidAmerican) 2014 Lawsuit: utilities claim TPO is an illegal utility Iowa Supreme Court rules
against claim
Kansas  (Westar, KCP&L,
Empire)
2014 Proposal to pay NM at lower rate of 150% of avoided cost Compromise passed (HB 2101
S  Sub)
Louisiana (Entergy) 2013 Proposal to pay NM at avoided cost rate PUC rejects, .5% cap retained
Maine  (various) 2015 PUC directed to develop alternative to NM,  value of solar
favored (LD 1263)
Legislation passed
Michigan (various) 2015 Change net metering to payment at wholesale rate (SB 438) Legislation under review
Minnesota (Xcel, etc.) 2013 Replaces NM with value of solar (HF 729) Legislation passed
Minnesota (rural coops) 2015 Municipal utility or coop allowed to charge NM fee (HF3) Legislation passed
Minnesota (other) 2015 Public power & cooperatives allowed to charge new NM
customers (HF 1437, HF 3)
Legislation passed
Montana (NorthWestern) 2013 Utility opposes bill to expand size of NM installations (SB
247)
Legislation not enacted
Montana (Montana-Dakota) 2015 Demand charge for residential DG solar PUC decision pending
Nevada (NV Energy) 2015 PUC authorized to allow ﬁxed fees, cap on NM increased
(SB 374); utility proposes fee increases to PUC
Compromise legislation
approved
New  Mexico (Public Service) 2015 NM connection fee of $18 to $30 per month, eliminate
month-to-month carry-over
PUC rejected
North Carolina (Duke, Edison) 2013 Investment in TPO, $37m in Clean Power Finance Agreement reached
Ohio  (AEP Ohio, First Energy) 2012–15 NM above usage offset paid at avoided cost rate Decision pending
Oklahoma (various) 2014 Allows PUC to approve monthly charge for DG solar and
wind
Approved (SB 1456)
South Carolina (Duke, etc.) 2014 Compromise: NM rates until 2025 if installed before 2020;
value of NM recalculated in 2020
PUC approves
Texas (Austin) 2012 Replace net metering with value of solar tariff City council approves
Texas  (San Antonio) 2014 Aggregated contracts between TPO ﬁrms and city utility Testing of pilot program
Utah  (Rocky Mountain) 2014 Proposed $4.65 monthly fee for DG solar PUC rejects
Utah (Rocky Mountain) 2014 Authorizes DG connection fee (SB 208) Approved but only for a study
Virginia (Dominion) 2014 Utility attempts to modify bills aimed at increasing
multi-family solar, replaces with bill to give utility
monopoly for TPO (SB 350, HB 906, HB 876)
Legislation not enacted
Washington (various) 2014 Establish utility monopoly for TPO (SB 2176) Legislation not enacted
West  Virginia (American
Electric Power)
2015 Prohibits utilities from allowing “cross-subsidization” of
customers for NM, no grandparent clause (HB 2201)
Legislature approves, governor
vetoes
Wisconsin (various) 2014–2015 DG connection fee (about $15 per month), ﬁxed charges
proposals for other utilities
PUC approves
Wyoming (Black Hills) 2014 $5–20 monthly surcharge on DG solar and wind Withdrawn
Key: DG = distributed generation; HF = house ﬁle; HB = house bill; NM = net metering; PUC: public utilities commission (state government regulatory body);
SB  = senate bill; TPO = third-party ownership.
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Value of solar tariffs (VOSTs) have been approved in two states (Minnesota, South Carolina) and in one municipal utility
(Austin), and they appear to be a growing alternative to net metering.
Utilities have also won approval to enter the solar leasing market, and they have invested in ﬁrms that provide solar leasing
and power purchase agreements. In this way utilities are developing a competitive position in a market that they are also
seeking to restrict.
Other strategies are described in Table 1, which indicates that the utilities are testing a range of strategies in the PUCS,
he legislatures, the courts, and the market (through acquisitions). Thus, one important insight into the analysis of regime
esistance is that it does not rest on a single strategy; rather, it involves testing various strategies with variable results that
n turn leads to policy learning and strategy changes.
.2. Four case studies
This section presents four of the most prominent cases of conﬂicts over DG solar, with attention to the role of political
arties and contentious politics in the niche-regime conﬂicts. The states were selected for the following reasons: Arizona
s known as the “ground zero” of the net metering conﬂicts and has been watched by utilities in other states; Colorado is a
olitically divided state that has sharp conﬂicts between pro- and anti-environmental coalitions; Hawaii is the state with
he highest penetration of DG solar and is an example of future trends; and Minnesota has attracted attention for pioneering
he “value of solar” compromise approach.
.2.1. Arizona
Unlike many states, which have an appointed PUC, the Arizona Corporate Commission is an elected ﬁve-member body
hat oversees a wide range of business regulation issues. In 2012 voters elected an all-Republican board and jettisoned
emocrats who had campaigned on a pro-solar ticket. The IOU Arizona Public Service proposed an end to net metering and
 fee of $50–100 per month for net metering customers. In response, the solar industry argued that the monthly fee would
ring solarization in this very sunny, desert state to a grinding halt, and in 2013 the industry responded to this challenge
nd challenges from utilities in other states by forming The Alliance for Solar Choice (TASC). In this conservative state,
pponents also found support from the former Republican Congressman Barry Goldwater, Jr., who  formed the organization
USK, or “Tell Utilities that Solar Won’t Be Killed.” The son of the famed conservative Arizona Senator who  ran for president
n 1964, Goldwater argued that it was “un-Republican” to take away solar choice. Thus, terms such as “solar choice” and the
oldwater name helped to reframe support for solar as a cause that could attract political conservatives.
Nevertheless, the conﬂict had a David-and-Goliath quality. Arizona Public Service disclosed to the PUC that its parent
orporation had spent $3.7 million on the solar battle that year, whereas TASC disclosed spending of $336,000 (Wyloge,
013). But the green-transition coalition was able to compensate for its lack of ﬁnancial power with contentious politics:
he coalition rallied hundreds of people in front of the PUC’s building to protest the proposed rate hike while others offered
estimony inside. In addition, a former commissioner called on one of the PUC commissioners to recuse himself from the
ote because of his connections with the utility. In late 2013 the state’s PUC ruled in favor of charging DG solar customers
0 cents per kilowatt hour of installed solar energy, that is, about $5 per month for a typical 7 kW system. The fee was much
ower than the reduced payment of $50–75 per month sought by the utility, and it was  the outcome of an eleventh-hour
ompromise offered by the solar industry in cooperation with the state’s Residential Utility Consumer Ofﬁce, a mediating
ody. Although the solar industry claimed a victory, it also recognized that the decision set a precedent for other states.
A second battle erupted in 2013 when the state government’s Department of Revenue determined that leased solar panels
ould not have a property tax exemption. The solar industry protested the loss of the tax exemption (which the utilities had
upported), and 200 people rallied at the state capitol building in protest. Solar advocates also delivered a petition of over
000 signatures to the governor, and two solar companies initiated litigation against the state’s interpretation of the law.
In 2014 and 2015 additional attempts to slow the growth of DG solar became evident. Various utilities continued to
ropose increased fees for net metering, and the utility Arizona Public Service asked the PUC to end the DG solar portion of
he renewable portfolio standard. It and another utility also sought permission to move ahead with a plan to install utility-
wned rooftop solar and to reimburse the customers at a modest rate rather than at retail. Although the solar coalition
rgued against the plan, the PUC approved it but at a lower level of investment than originally proposed. In addition, a letter
rom six members of the Arizona Congressional delegation to the Federal Trade Commission and the Consumer Financial
rotection Bureau alleged that solar companies engaged in misleading sales techniques. A journalist traced the original draft
f the letter back to an employee of a utility company in the state (Wyloge, 2015).
In summary, after the partial defeat of the proposed fee on net metering, there is a trend in the Arizona case toward
 more diversiﬁed strategy of stopping DG solar. Note that public outcry and protest occurred in response to only two of
he strategies. These both involved fees or taxes for consumers, and there was a clear government target against which the
ublic could mobilize..2.2. Colorado
Colorado is a politically divided state, and the appointed PUC board consists of three persons, at least one of whom must
e from a different political party than the other two. In 2013 and 2014 two of the three members were Democrats. The
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state’s renewable portfolio standard is 30% renewable energy and 3% distributed generation by 2020, and solar has grown
at an annual rate of 20% (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2015). In May, 2013, Xcel Energy Services Inc., (2013), the parent
company of the utility Public Service Company of Colorado, submitted a study in response to a 2009 proposal to add a
charge to net metering customers. In June, 2013, the Colorado Solar Energy Industries Association, a trade association for
200 ﬁrms, launched its “million roofs campaign” and called for strengthened net metering policy among other changes. A
month later Xcel proposed to reduce substantially payments for its net metering customers while also providing support for
its renewable energy credits program for DG solar. In December the Alliance for Solar Energy submitted a study to the PUC
that criticized the utility’s valuation of solar (Beach and McGuire, 2013). The study argued that additional beneﬁts should
have been included, and it noted that instead of draining revenue, DG solar provided a beneﬁt of over $13 million to the grid.
The advocacy organization Vote Solar also delivered a petition of 30,000 signatures to the utility’s executives and staged
a protest rally of 300 people in support of net metering. The media campaign framed the issue around solar “rights,” and
the pro-DG solar alliance asked the PUC to convene hearings to develop a standardized methodology for valuing DG solar
(Lappé, 2013). Meanwhile, a grassroots movement in the university town of Boulder continued an effort to municipalize its
electricity service.
Given the political sensitivity of the topic, in 2014 the PUC moved slowly and launched an open stakeholder discussion
about the future of solar energy in the state. Debate continued over the utility’s estimate that the value of DG solar was
roughly half of the 10.5 cents per kWh  paid under net metering. In December, 2014, the commission ruled against Xcel
on a related proposal, which would have allowed the utility to offer solar energy from a utility-scale generation facility in
exchange for a price premium on the utility bill. As of mid-2015 the PUC had not settled the matter.
3.2.3. Hawaii
Hawaii’s state legislature is dominated by the Democratic Party, and there has been a strong push for green-transition
policies, which include a goal of 100% renewable energy by 2045. For electricity the measures are driven partly by economic
considerations, because rates are nearly three times those of the national average due to the use of imported oil for electricity
generation. Thus, both economics and favorable policy converge to make Hawaii the state with the highest solarization rate,
which grew from 12 megawatts in 2008 to 40 megawatts in 2013. On Oahu, the island where the city of Honolulu is located,
more than 10% of the customers of the Hawaiian Electric Companies (HECO), an IOU that services about 95% of the state’s
customers, had DG solar.
By 2012 the revenue losses from net metering had reached $7.4 million, and HECO sought rate increases. The company
also was concerned with grid stability because of the high level of DG solar that was being fed into the system during
peak sunlight hours. In June, 2013, Governor Abercrombie approved Senate Bill 1087, a $100 million ﬁnancing program
for clean energy, including solar. By September, continued growth in solarization and concerns with grid stability led the
utility to require pre-authorization of new net metering applications for most areas on Oahu, even for units below 10 kW.
Homeowners and solar installers who found that their applications were being delayed or blocked complained to the state
legislature and to the PUC.
Although the problem of grid stability can be resolved technically, it would require signiﬁcant updates to the existing
technology. However, the state government supports solarization, and it wants to move ahead with grid modernization. In
April, 2014, the PUC ordered the utility to provide a DG interconnection plan within 120 days. Solar advocates protested
before a HECO board meeting and delivered a petition of 5000 signatures asking the utility to develop a plan to make solar
available to all customers, and in June the governor increased the pressure on HECO by signing a new law (House Bill 1943)
in support of technological updates favorable to DG solar. Later that year the utility released a plan to mitigate a range
of technical issues (e.g., improvements to inverters, circuits, and meters) and to allow the capacity of DG solar to triple
(Hawaiian Electric Companies, 2014). However, the utility’s plan also included a ﬁxed standby charge and a decrease in the
payment to customers for net excess generation, that is, generation above the level consumed by the building. In 2015 HECO
released its “DG 2.0” implementation plan that would pay net excess generation at the wholesale rate but would also allow
HECO to connect more DG solar (Hawaiian Electric Companies, 2015). The utility was also undergoing acquisition from the
Florida-based ﬁrm NextEra Energy, and it was not clear how the sale, if approved, would affect the unresolved issues of DG
solar growth in the state. Although some activists supported conversion of the utility to a cooperative or public power, the
company claimed that the acquisition would provide it with the resources to accelerate the transition to renewable energy.
3.2.4. Minnesota
Unlike the other three cases, in the Minnesota case there was no evidence for contentious politics in the sense of protest
rallies and petitions. However, the green-transition coalition was also the initiator of the policy reform, so it was operating
within the political process from the beginning. Elections in Minnesota in November 2012 changed both houses of the
legislature from Republican to Democratic-Farm-Labor (DFL) Party control. The party is equivalent to the Democratic Party
in other states, but its name is a product of the 1944 merger of the Democratic Party and the Progressive Era Farm-Labor
Party. Governor Dayton of the DFL Party called for a plan to reduce reliance on coal and to address climate change, and
a coalition of 75 environmental groups seized on the change in the political opportunity structure to propose a sweeping
legislative reform. Among their proposals was a renewable portfolio standard for solar energy of 10%; however, after intense
negotiations the environmental coalition backed down to a position of 4% by 2025. The utilities also opposed the revised
proposal, and DFL unity was weakened due to opposition from the rural electric cooperatives and amendments to end a
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oratorium on new nuclear energy. The ﬁnal law included a nonmandatory goal of 10% solar by 2030, a 1.5% solar standard
y 2020, the creation of solar community gardens (shared, locally-based solar panels that make solar accessible to renters and
ther people who do not want rooftop solar), an increase in the cap for net metering from 40 to 1000 kW,  and a requirement
hat customers forfeit net excess generation to the utility (Farrell, 2014). Although the compromise was far from what the
olar energy advocates had originally requested, they viewed the outcome as a partial victory.
Minnesota attracted national attention because part of the compromise was to allow the state’s IOUs the option to
alculate payments to customers based on a value of solar tariff (VOST) instead of the retail price. The VOST approach is
ased on the actual cost and beneﬁts of DG solar to the utility, but as in the case of Xcel in Colorado these calculations are
ubject to dispute, and there are various valuation methods at play (Hansen et al., 2013). In the Minnesota case, the law states
hat the valuation method must include environmental beneﬁts, the positive effects of DG solar on transmission congestion,
nd savings on energy losses over long transmission lines. All three of the criteria would increase the value of DG solar. The
OST compromise also included a two-meter program called “buy all, sell all.” Under the arrangement, customers must buy
ll of their electricity from the utility, and they must sell all of their DG solar to the utility rather than sell only their net
xcess generation. Essentially this rule ends the net metering policy of payment at the retail rate. In March, 2014, the state’s
UC voted to adopt a VOST methodology prepared by the Department of Commerce based on a lengthy stakeholder process.
Although VOST is emerging as an alternative to net metering in other places (e.g., South Carolina and Texas), the primary
ational organization in support of DG solar, TASC, opposes it. The organization does not like the idea of forcing consumers
o sell all of their DG power to the utility, and its leaders argue that the sale of the power to the grid may  be taxable income
Wesoff, 2014). Thus, the VOST approach has divided the DG solar industry, with some advocates willing to try it as an
lternative to net metering and TASC taking a harder line in favor of net metering.
. Conclusion
Although this study has focused on one niche-regime industrial conﬂict in one country, some generalizations are possible.
irst, the concept of regime resistance should be pluralized so that researchers study how regime organizations test a range
f strategies and engage in learning. Furthermore, they test strategies in both the economic ﬁeld (such as acquisitions of
iche organizations or setting up divisions to enter the niche market) and in the political ﬁeld (such as by attempting
o capture the regulatory process to gain favorable rules). Second, even where regime organizations have much greater
nancial capacity than niche organizations to inﬂuence the political ﬁeld, niche supporters can successfully overcome regime
esistance strategies by mobilizing social movements, by building coalitions with political parties, and by gaining investment
nd other support countervailing industrial ﬁrms. Third, the niche-regime strategies vary depending on the political party
hat is in power.
With respect to political party and strategies of regime organizations, two hypotheses also emerge for future research.
irst, when a political party associated with the green transition coalition controls the government, the regime coalitions will
end to adopt strategies that are linked to technical issues (e.g., in Hawaii), or they will likely seek negotiated settlements (e.g.,
n Colorado and Minnesota). Thus, regime actors are not swept aside when a party aligned with the green coalition comes to
ower, but the tilt toward the green coaltion may  result in a more protracted and deliberative process with compromises.
econd, when a political party associated with the regime coalitions controls the government, the regime coalitions will
end to favor a more antagonistic strategy that directly undermines the niche, such as by altering the net metering pricing
cheme severely (as was attempted in Arizona and achieved in Wisconsin). However, when regime organizations threaten
he ﬁnancial livelihood of the niche organizations and consumer investments, contentious politics may  become likely.
The ﬁndings and hypotheses may  have some general value for future research on niche-regime conﬂicts in other industries
nd other countries. One example is the country of Germany, which like the U.S. has a DG solar industry that is not controlled
y the utilities and has niche-regime relations that are connected with political party positions (Geels et al., 2014; Hoppmann
t al., 2014). In Germany resistance from the “big four” utilities has resulted in changes in reductions in the payment scheme
or DG solar, and these changes may  have been accomplished via a negotiated process; thus, there may  be pattern similar
o the one identiﬁed above. Likewise, in Germany the utilities have claimed that increased renewable energy poses risks to
rid stability, a situation that is analogous to the strategy pursued by the utility in Hawaii. Furthermore, social movement
obilization has been important for maintaining the political inﬂuence of green transition coalitions, although in Germany
he mobilizations were more salient regarding nuclear energy and the Energiewende. However, it appears that the role of
ountervailing industrial power in the form of investment in the TPO market has been less important in Germany.
Although comparative, cross-national analysis is beyond the scope of this study, the main ﬁndings and hypotheses may
rovide some insights into niche-regime conﬂicts in other countries with some similar dynamics, such as Germany, and
otentially in other industries that are undergoing a green transition. The analysis suggests that the concept of regime
esistance should be broken down into strategies of both the regime and niche organizations, and that the strategies should
n turn be related to differences in the political opportunity structure, especially when party politics have become aligned
ith the niche-regime conﬂict. Thus, this study suggests one way  forward in the growing literature on the important topic
f politics and power in STs.
50 D.J. Hess / Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 19 (2016) 42–50
Acknowledgement
I acknowledge comments on a preliminary draft from participants in the Workshop on Incumbent-Challenger Interactions
in Energy Transitions at the University of Stuttgart in 2014.
References
Avelino, F., Rotmans, J., 2009. Power in transition: an interdisciplinary framework to study power in relation to structural change. Eur. J. Social Theory 12
(4),  543–569.
Beach, R., McGuire, P., 2013. Beneﬁts and costs of distributed solar generation for Public Service Company of Colorado: a critique of PsCo’s solar
distributed generation study. Crossborder Energy (accessed 22.08.15.).
http://www.oursolarrights.org/ﬁles/5513/8662/3174/Crossborder Study of the Beneﬁts of Distributed Solar Generation for PSCo.pdf.
Cardwell, D., 2013. On rooftops, a rival for utilities. N. Y. Times (July).
Center for Responsive Politics, 2015. Interest Groups, http://www. opensecrets. org/industries/ (accessed 22.08.15.).
Coley, J., Hess, D., 2012. Green energy laws and Republican legislators in the United States. Energy Policy 48 (1), 576–583.
Elzen, B., Geels, F., Leeuwis, C., van Mierlo, B., 2011. Normative contestation in transitions ‘in the making’: animal welfare concerns and system innovation
in  pig husbandry. Res. Policy 40 (2), 263–275.
Farrell, J., 2014. Minnesota’s value of solar: can a northern state’s new policies diffuse distributed generation battles? Inst. Local Self-Reliance (accessed
22.08.15.). http://www.ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MN-Value-of-Solar-from-ILSR.pdf.
Geels, F., 2014. Regime resistance against low-carbon energy transitions: introducing politics and power into the multi-level perspective. Theory, Culture,
Soc.  31 (5), 21–40.
Geels, F., Fuchs, G., Kern, F., Kungl, G., Hindere, N., Neukirch, M.,  Wasserman, S., 2014. Unleashing new entrants versus working with incumbents: a
comparative multi-level analysis of the German and U.K. low-carbon electricity transitions (1990–2013). In: Paper Presented at the Workshop on
Incumbent-challenger Interactions in Energy Transitions. University of Stuttgart.
Grin, J., Rotmans, J., Schot, J., 2011. On patterns and agency in transition dynamics: some key insights from the KSI program. Environ. Innov. Soc. Trans. 1
(1),  76–81.
Hansen, L., Lacy, V., Glick, D., 2013. A Review of PV Solar Beneﬁt and Cost Studies. Rocky Mountain Institute, Boulder, CO.
Hawaiian Electric Companies, 2014. Distrib. Gener. Interconnection Plan (accessed 22.08.15.).
http://ﬁles.hawaii.gov/puc/4 Book%201%20%28transmittal%20ltr DGIP Attachments%20A-1%20to%20A-5%29pdf.
Hawaiian Electric Companies , Hawaiian Electric Companies’ Motion for Approval of NEM Program Modiﬁcation and Establishment of Transitional
Generation Program Administration Tariff 2015 http://dms.puc.hawaii.gov/dms/DocumentViewer?pid=A1001001A15A20B13419D27829 (accessed
22.08.15.).
Hess,  D., 2014. Sustainability transitions: a political coalition perspective. Res. Policy 43 (2), 278–283.
Hess, D., Mai, Q., 2015. The convergence of economic development and energy transition policies in state-government plans in the United States.
Sustainability 11 (1), 5–20.
Hess, D., Coley, J., Mai, Q., Hilliard, L., 2015. Party differences and energy reform: ﬁscal conservatism in the California legislature. Environ. Politics 24 (2),
228–248.
Hess, D., Mai, Q., Brown, K., 2016. Red states, green laws: ideology and renewable energy legislation in the United States. Energy Res. Social Sci., in press.
Hoppmann, J., Huenteler, J., Girod, B., 2014. Compulsive policy-making: the evolution of the German feed-in tariff system for photovoltaic power. Res.
Policy  43 (8), 1422–1441.
Jiusto, S., McCauley, S., 2010. Assessing sustainability transition in the U.S. electrical power system. Sustainability 2 (2), 551–575.
Kann, S., Mehta, S., Shiao, M.,  2013. U.S. Solar Market Insight ZReport. Q1 2013. GreenTech Media and Solar Industries Association, Solar Energy Industries
Association, Washington, D.C.
Kern, F., Smith, A., 2008. Restructuring energy systems for sustainability? Energy transition policy in the Netherlands. Energy Policy 36 (11), 4093–4103.
Kind, P., 2013. Disruptive Challenges: Financial Implications and Strategic Responses to a Changing Retail Electric Business. Edison Electric Institute,
Washington, D.C.
Laird, F., 2001. Solar Energy, Technology Policy, and Institutional Values. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.
Lappé, A., 2013. Testimony urges Colorado’s PUC to reject Xcel’s net metering rollback. VoteSolar (Dec) (accessed 22.08.15.).
http://votesolar.org/2013/12/14/testimony-urges-colorado-puc-to-reject-xcels-unfair-net-metering-rollback/.
Lipschutz, R., Mulvaney, D., 2013. The road not taken, round II: centralized v. distributed energy strategies and human security. In: Dyer, H., Trombetta, M.
(Eds.), International Handbook of Energy Security. Edward Elgar, Northampton, MA,  pp. 483–586.
McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., Tilly, C., 2001. Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Meadowcroft, J., 2011. Engaging with the politics of sustainability transitions. Environ. Innov. Soc. Trans. 1 (1), 70–75.
Metz, W.,  1977. Solar thermal electricity: power tower dominates renewables. Science 197 (July 22), 353–356.
Normann, H., 2015. The role of politics in sustainable transitions: the rise and decline of off-shore wind in Norway. Environ. Innov. Soc. Trans. 15 (June),
180–193.
Reece, R., 1979. The Sun Betrayed: A Report on the Corporate Seizure of U.S. Solar Energy. South End Press, Boston, MA.
Sabatier, P., Weible, C., 2007. The advocacy coalition framework: innovations and clariﬁcations. In: Sabatier, Paul A. (Ed.), Theories of the Policy Process.
Westview Press, Boulder, CO, pp. 189–220.
Scott, J., 1987. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
Stoutenborough, J.W., Beverlin, M.,  2008. Encouraging pollution-free energy: the diffusion of state net metering policies. Social Sci. Q. 89 (5), 1230–1251.
U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2015. Proﬁle Overview (accessed 22.08.15.). http://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=CO.
Verbong, G., Geels, F., 2007. The ongoing transition: lessons from a socio-technical, multi-level analysis of the Dutch electricity system (1960–2004).
Energy Policy 35 (2), 1025–1037.
Voss, J., Smith, A., Grin, J., 2009. Designing long-term policy: rethinking transition management. Policy Sci. 42 (4), 275–302.
Wesoff, E., 2014. Solar policy: IRS now part of ﬁerce debate over how to value solar power. GreenTech Media (accessed 22.08.15.).
www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Solar-Policy-Battle-IRS-Now-Part-of-Fierce-Debate-on-How-to-Value-Solar-Po.
Wiser, R., Namovicz, C., Gielecki, M.,  Smith, R., 2007. The experience with renewable portfolio standards in the United States. Elec. J. 20 (4), 8–20.
Wyloge, E., 2013. Arizona public service: $3.7 million spent on net metering publicity. Arizona Capital Times (Nov).
Wyloge, E., 2015. APS employee drafted anti-solar letter signed by AZ congressman. Arizona Capitol Times (Jan).
Xcel Energy Services Inc., Costs and Beneﬁts of Distributed Solar Generation on the Public Service Company of Colorado System. Study Report in Response
to  Colorado Public Utilities Commission Decision No. C09-1223 2013;
http://votesolar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/11M-426E PSCo DSG StudyReport 052313pdf.
